Putting the Australian Labor Party in international perspective by Scott, Andrew
	 	
	
 
 
 
This is the published version:  
	
Scott,	Andrew	2003,	Putting	the	Australian	Labor	Party	in	international	perspective,	
in	APSA	2004	:	Proceedings	of	the	Australian	Political	Studies	Association	2003,	APSA,	
[Hobart,	Tas.],	pp.	1‐25.	
	
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30041529	
 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner. 
 
 
Copyright : 2003,	APSA 
	
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Putting the Australian Labor Party in 
International Perspective 
 
 
 
Dr Andrew Scott 
School of Social Science and Planning 
RMIT University 
 
 
Refereed paper presented to the 
Australasian Political Studies Association Conference 
University of Tasmania, Hobart 
29 September – 1 October 2003 
Andrew Scott:  Putting the Australian Labor Party in International Perspective 
 
Page 1 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the Australian Labor Party's current debates over future directions 
with reference to attempts by the left of centre political parties in other western nations, 
especially in Western Europe, to deal with the end of the economic "golden age" since the 
early 1970s and the widespread resurgence of neo-liberal ideologies since the late 1970s. 
The dominant recent view of such comparisons has been through the ideological lens of 
the "Third Way". This vision however tends not to see relevant variations between the 
experiences of social democratic parties in individual Western European nations as they 
have sought to deal with adverse circumstances since the early 1970s.  Nor does the Third 
Way view sufficiently extend to the widely varying background landscapes: that is, the 
different levels of historical achievement by left of centre parties in the different nations.  
Some social democratic parties in European countries are pursuing more progressive 
political agendas than the British Labour Party under Tony Blair and they are starting 
from a very different basis of policy achievement and political strength than either the 
British or Australian labour parties. The nature and extent of these international 
differences need now to be highlighted from an Australian political perspective in order to 
better inform the current debate about the range of options for the ALP and the current 
comparative condition of the Australian party system.  As part of this analysis, the 
relationship between the erosion of the traditional blue-collar support bases of the major 
left of centre parties in various nations, amid economic restructuring and challenges to 
traditional immigration patterns, and the rise of support for anti-immigrant policies and 
parties, need to be carefully examined and evaluated. 
 
The Australian Labor Party is currently in opposition at the national level and has 
been for seven years.  As such it is like most nominally left of centre parties in 
western nations.  A ‘swing to the right’ has been reported in western Europe since 
the big rise in support for Jörge Haider’s xenophobic Freedom Party in elections in 
Austria in October 1999, and that party’s entry into a conservative-led coalition 
government, which ended 30 years of social democrat-led government in that nation.  
The ‘swing to the right’ in Europe has included: a rise in support for anti-
immigration politicians in Switzerland in October 1999; the election of a conservative 
government in Spain in April 2000; the defeat of the left of centre ‘Olive Tree’ 
coalition and return of Silvio Berlusconi as Prime Minister of Italy in June 2001; the 
replacement of a Labor government with a conservative/christian democratic/liberal 
coalition government in Norway in September 2001, underpinning which the anti-
immigration Progress Party holds the parliamentary balance of power; the election of 
a right of centre government to replace the social democratic government of 
Denmark in November 2001 and its subsequent enactment of the harshest 
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immigration laws in Europe, in what has traditionally been one of the continent’s 
most tolerant countries; the election of a moderate conservative coalition to replace 
the social democratic government of Portugal in March 2002; the defeat of the 
Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and the strong showing of the neo-fascist Jean-
Marie Le Pen in the Presidential election in France in March-April 2002; and the 
surge in support for the party of assassinated populist Pim Fortuyn in the 
Netherlands election in May 2002, which helped end eight years in office of a left-led 
(Labour Party coalition) government in that country.   
 
Against this trend however has been the fact that a socialist government remains in 
office in Greece; that Sweden’s social democratic government was re-elected in 
September 2002 and that in the same month the social democrat Gerhard Schroeder 
was re-elected as German Chancellor on a platform opposed to the United States 
(US)-led war with Iraq (as well as to US-style economic policy).  And, although 
French voters put Le Pen ahead of the Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in the 
first round of voting in the Presidential election, they then - shocked at what the 
accumulated effect of miscellaneous protest votes had done - marginalized Le Pen in 
the second round in October 2002, rallying behind the more mainstream candidate of 
the Right, Jacques Chirac, on a platform of moderation.1  The mainstream party of the 
Right in Austria (the People’s Party) did likewise in 2002 to Haider’s Freedom Party 
following the strong, Europe-wide reaction against Haider’s party’s entry into 
government in 1999.  The Austrian Social Democratic Party’s vote also rose in the 
November 2002 elections, although not sufficiently for it to return to Government.  
Further, the rightist coalition government elected in the Netherlands quickly 
collapsed, in October 2002, after ‘Fortuyn’s List’ fragmented, and a new election was 
held in January 2003 in which the Labour Party’s vote rebounded to the point where 
serious discussions occurred about it entering into coalition government with the 
other major party, the Christian Democrats.  The unprecedented election of the 
Workers’ Party’s Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (‘Lula’) as President of Brazil in October 
2002 is also worthy of note in any balanced discussion of recent international political 
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trends.  It should also be recalled that it was only three years ago that Europe was 
seen as having undergone a ‘swing to the Left’, with 11 of the 15 European Union 
(EU) member nations being governed by left of centre parties early in the year 2000.  
What is certain then is that there is electoral volatility in Europe, just as there is 
elsewhere in the western world.2   
 
In discussions about this electoral volatility, parallels have been drawn between the 
rise of the anti-immigrant right in Europe and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in 
Australia.  The relationship between the erosion of the traditional blue-collar support 
bases of the major left of centre parties in various nations, amid economic 
restructuring and challenges to traditional immigration patterns, and the rise of 
support for anti-immigrant policies and parties, need to be carefully examined and 
evaluated.  An Australian journalist (then European correspondent for The Age 
newspaper), Geoff Kitney, wrote in October 1999 in the days after the rise of Haider’s 
party in Austria that: 
 
support for the far right is fed by disillusionment over the failure of free market 
economics to improve the lives of ordinary people after the fall of communism.  
Unemployment and poverty in former Soviet bloc countries have been the only dividend 
for millions of people.3 
 
Another informed Australian journalist, Tim Colebatch, wrote just after the official 
inauguration of the controversial new Austrian government, in early 2000, that the 
 
coalition government…formed in Vienna last week [was] between the People's Party 
(their equivalent of our Liberal Party) and the right-wing populist Freedom Party (their 
more successful version of One Nation).  
 
He cautioned that: 
 
overreaction can only fan the sense of grievance and xenophobia that is the source of his 
[Haider’s] growing political strength. It might suit people in the West to present him as 
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leading some neo-Nazi movement in Austria, but those who actually follow Austrian 
politics know that is untrue.  
 
…His antennas sense every displeasure and discontent among Austria's lower middle 
class ... Haider promises them a comfortable status quo, if only the asylum-seekers and 
immigrant workers were sent away and the EU was not extended (to include Eastern 
Europe)... Haider's party is a print-out of the discontents with this (welfare) state….  
 
American political scientist Max Riedlsperger, an avowed left-liberal, says the idea that 
Haider and his party hold “the seeds of totalitarianism" is laughable.  Haider, he argues 
in a 1996 book, Austro-Corporatism: Past, Present, Future, is essentially a politician 
stirring up protest votes: against immigration above all, against unemployment, welfare 
cheats, high taxes and poor government services, crime and soft sentencing.  
 
The Freedom Party has prospered under Haider largely because Austria's system of 
proportional representation kept condemning the two major parties to govern together 
in a “Grand Coalition". This slowly eroded the raison d'etre of the conservative People's 
Party, the junior partner in the coalition, and ensured that protest votes could only go 
elsewhere, primarily to Haider.  
 
…he appeals to the young because he comes over as…a cool guy who says things you're 
not allowed to say, prefers casual clothes to suits and puts Austrians first. As 
Riedlsperger argues, he plays on “the disconnect between the political elite and the rank-
and-file", allowing ordinary people to “express these feelings that are kind of pent-up".  
 
This is the politics of grievance, not Nazism.4 
 
Similarly, with the Netherlands, commentary has emphasised that Fortuyn appealed 
as a colourful outsider to the consensus, behind-closed-doors approach of the 
previously governing multi-party coalition.  There are clear resemblances in all of 
this to the part played by Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party as an outlet for the 
expression of discontent against the Australian political establishment, including on 
economic policy, following the ALP’s convergence with the conservative parties in 
favour of neoliberalism in the 1980s and early 1990s.   
 
The electoral volatility which has recently been evident in parts of Europe, as in 
Australia, must be seen at least partly as the product of labour and social democratic 
parties’ own failure in recent decades to promote policies which advance the 
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interests of their traditional supporters.  The decline in the ideological gap between 
parties caused by the move of labour and social democratic parties to the Right has 
certainly weakened individual voters' partisan attachments and affected election 
results in Britain and Australia; and it may well have done so also in other nations, in 
Europe. 
 
After the election to government in 1997 of a British Labour Party sharply shifted to 
the Right under Tony Blair, a process influenced in part by the Hawke and Keating 
Australian Labor Party governments of 1983 to 1996, there was an endeavour to 
philosophise the policy departures of modern social democrats as amounting to a 
new ‘Third Way’.5  This slogan in turn attracted some support in some ALP quarters, 
among acolytes of Blair and the then US President Bill Clinton, as the ALP faced its 
first few years trying to renew from Opposition.  The so-called ‘Third Way’ has been 
effectively criticised from several perspectives however.  Although it claims to offer a 
strategy for renewing the left of centre that avoids both the free-market liberalism of 
the New Right and the state socialism of the Old Left, it has been criticised for, at the 
least, “conceding too much to neo-liberal prejudice”.6  As Will Hutton notes in his 
important new book, The World We’re In, “the social democratic parties in Germany, 
the Netherlands and Scandinavia…have given up less ground than [Britain’s] New 
Labour”.7  Blair’s Labour Party has prompted “widespread distrust among its own 
supporters of the borrowed American conservatism that informs many of its criminal 
justice and social policies” and as a result, Hutton argues, “it will need to be more 
open to European examples and models rather than having its options closed down 
by a blinkered focus on America”.8  The ALP has also been heavily influenced by 
ideas from the US Democrats, some of them via Blair’s New Labour, and it will also 
need now to be more open to European examples and policy models if it is to rebuild 
support.  The policy position of European social democratic parties, and its contrast 
with that of the Clintonised British Labour Party, can be readily seen in the 
Declaration of Paris signed at the (most recent) congress of the Socialist International, 
held in November 1999.9  Blair’s government and any pretence it makes to social 
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democratic credentials have been particularly badly dented in the last twelve months 
including among its peers in Europe and in the eyes of its erstwhile supporters in the 
ALP by its gung-ho support of the US-led war on Iraq and by its earlier attempts to 
adopt very harsh measures against refugees.  On both issues it has been rebuffed by 
other European nations including even by France under the conservative President 
Chirac.  The ALP under the leadership of Kim Beazley in 2001 took a hostile attitude 
to refugees like that which Blair has taken.  Under the subsequent leadership of 
Simon Crean however it has moderated that hostility somewhat and also, 
significantly, it opposed the unilateral US-led war on Iraq, unlike Blair’s New Labour 
but like the social democratic parties of Europe.  
 
There are of course historical organisational differences between ‘labour’ and ‘social 
democratic’ parties in that labour parties are formally affiliated with trade unions.  
Nevertheless, the Australian Labor Party, the British Labour Party, and the New 
Zealand Labour Party, in common with the Western European socialist and social 
democratic parties - but unlike the US Democratic Party which is at most a liberal 
democratic rather than a social democratic party - have all long been members 
together of the Socialist International.  The historical importance of the organisational 
distinction between labour and social democratic parties may be overstated, given 
the central importance of cooperation with national trade union bodies in the 
continental European social democratic parties10.  In fact it is those parties which 
have built up the strongest corporatist institutional arrangements involving trade 
union co-operation at the level of national government policy making.  The notion 
that the Australian labour movement has been “pragmatic, lacking principles, bereft 
of theory” in comparison with northern hemisphere counterparts because of its 
‘labourist’ rather than ‘socialist’ or ‘social democratic’ history has also been rightly 
criticised.11  Even if such distinctions were once important they are generally seen as 
having reduced since the 1970s with the Whitlam Government bringing Australian 
Labor more into line with European ‘social democratic’ parties’ policies in its 
initiatives for health and welfare provision.12  The two types of left of centre party, 
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whether ‘labour’ or ‘social democratic’, face essentially similar strategic and policy 
challenges now. 
 
There have been important and instructive political variations between the 
experiences of socialist and social democratic parties in individual Western European 
nations as they have sought to deal with the end of the economic "golden age" since 
the early 1970s and the widespread resurgence of neo-liberal ideologies since the late 
1970s.  There have also been widely varying and enduring historical achievements by 
the left of centre parties in these nations, which should not be glossed over.  As well 
as pursuing more progressive political agendas than the British Labour Party under 
Tony Blair some social democratic parties in European countries are starting from a 
very different (much firmer) basis of policy achievement and political strength than 
either the British or Australian labour parties.  The nature and extent of these 
international differences need now to be highlighted from an Australian political 
perspective in order to better inform the current debate about the range of options 
for the ALP and the current comparative condition of the Australian party system.  
In his new major history of the Left in Europe, Geoff Eley points out “the variegated 
hegemony of neo-liberal policies throughout Europe”13 in the 1980s and 1990s.  
“Where government favoured them and public values backed full employment, 
unions survived, whether socialists or conservatives governed”14, he points out.  
“Swedish union density rose from 67.7 percent in 1970 to 82.5 percent by 1990” in 
contrast to elsewhere.  “Where social democratic corporatism was strongest – 
Scandinavia, Austria, West Germany – damage to the working class could be 
contained, whether in jobs, incomes, benefits, political representation, union 
organization, the socially organised capacities of working-class communities, or the 
social value accorded to labor and its culture and traditions.  There, even under 
retreat, organized labor kept better resources and self-confidence in the political 
arena”.15  Ideas for “a revised social contract based on distributive justice, social 
citizenship and the welfare state…alternatives to radical marketization…were still 
functioning in parts of Western Europe…despite the dominant neo-liberalism of the 
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1980s; [in] Scandinavia, West Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, [and] even 
France”.16   
 
Neo-liberalism has not swamped all social democratic parties in the world in recent 
decades uniformly.  Full employment survived into the 1990s in Sweden, well 
beyond the trend in other nations.  The defeat of the Social Democrats in the 1991 
Swedish elections was seen by some at that time as evidence that neo-liberalism had 
conquered even the strongest stronghold of western social democracy.  However, the 
fact remains that this non Social Democratic government was voted out of office after 
only one term in Sweden in 1994 after it made cuts to welfare.  The Social Democrats 
have since their return to government in 1994 been re-elected twice and have 
successfully adapted, and essentially preserved, the Swedish model.  Successful 
adaptation has likewise occurred in Denmark.17  Nations such as Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway and the Netherlands are continuing to provide strong public welfare outlays 
and to build high-skill economies through high levels of public investment in 
education and strong governmental, industrial and social partnerships.  They have 
continued to achieve solid economic growth while retaining a comparatively very 
even distribution of wealth and income.  The Social Democratic Party has now 
governed Sweden for no less than 62 out of the 71 years since 1932.  The Australian 
Labor Party has been in office for just 24 of those years.  The reasons for the 
hegemony and resilience of social democracy in northern Europe would repay 
revisiting now as part of any open-minded consideration of policy and political 
options for an ALP seeking to rebuild support.  Australian Labor could benefit from 
closer study of the policies followed in particular northern European nations which 
have been instrumental in achieving economic prosperity with comparative equality 
there, and from closer study of the possibility of transferring such policies to 
Australia. 
 
Elements in the Australian labour movement have, of course, previously looked to 
the Scandinavian model of social democracy as a way of transcending their political 
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problems, embedding better workers' rights and social welfare entitlements, and 
generally moving beyond the limitations of Anglo-Saxon economic and political 
culture. The 1987 Australia Reconstructed report on a trade union and government 
delegation to Scandinavia and Western Europe was a concerted effort to bring some 
of the fruits of the Scandinavian and other Western European social democratic 
parties’ success to Australia.18  There have been more fleeting glimpses of appealing 
‘European models’ many times since too.  The strong, quality vocational training 
system in Germany and the ability of vocationally trained individuals in Germany 
and Denmark to adapt to a variety of skilled occupations along a secure career path; 
the prevalence of generous paid maternity leave, of paternity leave, the relative 
gender equality and the priority given to the rights and needs of children in 
Scandinavian countries; the social charter/chapter for workers’ rights adopted in 
Europe in the late 1980s, and the required role across that continent for works 
councils, are among many continuing policy attractions of ‘European models’                   
which have occasionally attracted the interest of Australian Labor.  In employment 
policy, parts of Europe such as the Netherlands have been held up in recent years as 
an alternative model for Australia to the US in achieving a very low unemployment 
rate but without low-wage jobs, inequality, stress in the workplace or welfare cuts.  
The victory of the Socialist Party in the French parliamentary elections in 1997 
chiefly on the issue of unemployment and on a platform of expansionary direct job 
creation and shorter working hours after only a short period of conservative 
Government during which unemployment had risen gave heart to the federal ALP, 
and to the Left in particular, then.  While Jospin’s government in France lasted only 
until 2002, the regulated reduction of working hours since 1997 is rated by many as a 
success in helping reduce unemployment and it has also left a social legacy.  
Another set of successful (and arguably ‘social democratic’) employment and 
industrial relations policies pursued in Europe in recent years has been in Ireland.  
Europe's rising "new left" in the mid to late 1990s, particularly with the initial 
ascendancy of Oskar Lafontaine in the first Schroeder German Social Democratic 
Party government, and the change to a left-of-centre government in Italy in 1996, led 
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by a former communist from 1998 to 2001, attracted Australian interest in Europe as 
a clearly countervailing influence and alternative social and political model to the 
US, notwithstanding Lafontaine's early exit from the German Government and 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's decision to align for some time to more orthodox 
neo-liberal economic policies.  The recent reported ‘rise of the right’ in Europe may 
have dissipated this interest but continental European social democracy is likely to 
offer much more promise for ALP policy and political renewal than a continuing 
adherence to the essentially neo-liberal policies pursued by Clinton and Blair. 
 
Following the 1987 release of the report of the Australia Reconstructed mission, Francis 
Castles - a British-born scholar of Scandinavian social democracy and of comparative 
public policy, who from the mid 1980s to 2001 was a prominent academic in 
Australia (and New Zealand) before his recent return to Britain – generally 
supported the direction of that report’s proposals.19  However, he expressed some 
reservations about its underlying rationale.  Castles emphasised then that Australian 
‘laborism’ was quite distinct from the European ‘social democratic’ tradition and that 
Australia had created a ‘wage earner’s welfare state’ by other means than traditional 
European-style state provision, notably through equalising of primary incomes 
through arbitrated regulation of the labour market.  Indeed, he contended then that 
“one might easily mount a case that laborism [in the policy sense] works just as well 
as the social democratic strategy” and at that time he criticised other scholars for 
their “simplistic” and “dismissive” classification of Australia as a merely liberal 
welfare state.20  For many years, Castles defended the policy record of the Australian 
Labor governments of 1983-1996 in moderating market-driven inequality.  For many 
years he has been cited as the main authority by defenders of the relative adequacy – 
by international standards - of Australia’s welfare provision.  Very recently, 
however, Castles has conceded that 
 
Welfare gains by regulative means can also be removed without that fact being as 
evident as it would be if reflected in substantial public spending shifts.  And Castles’ 
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claim [now] is that they have been removed…such removal was possible without a 
major clash of values because few ordinary citizens realized just what was at stake.  The 
cost of achieving policy objectives relatively invisibly is that the relevant policies can be 
removed no less invisibly.21 
 
Today, indeed, Castles himself believes that the industrial relations deregulations 
unleashed, and the social policy restrictions imposed, by successive Australian 
governments in the 1990s have so eroded Australia’s distinctive welfare state that it 
has now reached the point that the only positive future does indeed lie in attempts 
“to redesign Australian welfare institutions along more European lines”.22  This is a 
significant statement. 
 
Defenders of the Hawke government's early and sharp right turn away from the 1982 
social democratic economic platform upon which it had been elected pointed to 
similar actions by the contemporary governing socialist parties of France and 
Greece.23  They could also have added: Spain.  There is no doubt that the 1980s were 
difficult times intellectually for left of centre parties to be in office.  However some 
European social democrats have responded in a relatively far-sighted way to the 
1980s experience of financial market pressure to abandon policy.  They have kept 
their original social democratic objectives.  Will Hutton describes how French 
Socialists have for long envisaged that a “single [European] market and single 
currency would create a complete European economic space sufficiently large to host 
a challenge both to the [US] dollar and to the conservative ideology of the financial 
markets, and so create the possibility of the kind of expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policy that both [Jacques] Delors and [Francois] Mitterand – from their experience in 
the early 1980s – knew was impossible for any single European economy”.24 Will 
Hutton’s book champions the idea that there is a general ‘European social model’, 
distinct from US-style capitalism.  He wants to protect what he sees as Europe’s 
associative, stakeholder capitalisms, with their strong public realms and their 
embedded social contracts (including adequate levels of public spending, and 
comprehensive welfare provision) before the march of an imposing ideologically 
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American form of ‘globalisation’.  “Europe does have an approach to capitalism that 
is distinct from that of the US, and although there are different variants across 
Europe, more unites than differentiates them”, Hutton argues.25  A strong resistance 
has been previously noticed in continental Europe to the US cultural dominance 
symbolised by the ubiquitous spread of McDonalds fast food restaurants which 
threaten both the former distinctive, individual cafes and the continuing viability of 
quality regional food produce. 
 
In The World We’re In Hutton challenges the claims of superior US economic 
performance in recent decades, emphasising that the strong growth of the US 
economy from 1995 to 2000 was an old-fashioned consumer boom built on record 
credit and is therefore unsustainable.  “The credit that has driven the consumption – 
and much of the jobs growth – has been taken on by ordinary wage-earners even as 
their wages have been squeezed in real terms…they [therefore] face highly uncertain 
economic prospects with enormous cumulative debts…The great job-generating 
machine is coming to the end of its capacity to deliver”, he contends.26  Hutton 
emphasises the reality of entrenched and massive poverty and inequality, and 
tolerance of these, in the US and the contrast between this and Europe (including 
Britain).    He criticises the torrent of “propaganda” which has emanated from 
twenty-five years of neo-liberal political dominance in the US and which has 
pervaded the world’s financial press, tending to praise American labour force 
‘flexibility’ and tending to unfairly condemn, by contrast, Europe’s labour force as 
‘sclerotic’.  Hutton mobilises counter evidence that Europe in fact works better and 
fairer than America.  It is well known that the official US unemployment rate 
understates the actual extent of the social problem due to the very high numbers of 
imprisoned men in that country.  It has been estimated that “a further 2 per cent 
could be added to the [US] official unemployment rate if the large numbers of 
incarcerated males in that country are counted…[in which case] US unemployment 
would look very similar to many other countries”.27 Hutton supplements this with 
the revelation that “the non-employment rate for men aged between twenty-five and 
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fifty-four over the period 1988-95 was 11.9 in the US (excluding the very high US 
incarceration rate in prison)…[wheras it] averaged 11.7 per cent in Germany, Italy 
and France”.28  Drawing on the work of Fritz Scharpf, Hutton further writes that: “the 
Nordic countries have achieved high employment with high social spending and 
generous levels of income support for the unemployed”, and that “the size of a 
welfare state and generosity of unemployment benefit have no impact at all on 
employment”.29  A separate study by Goodin et al has produced clear evidence to the 
effect that social democratic welfare states from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s 
demonstrated superior records to liberal regimes not just in social policy but also in 
economic policy outcomes.30  Hutton highlights the continuing success of tyre-maker 
Michelin despite “the allegedly crippling confines of the 35 hour week recently 
introduced in France”.31  Against the much-hyped US leadership of the so-called 
‘New Economy’32 he points to the more substantial industrial success of Finland’s 
Nokia, the world’s leading mobile phone company33.  The ALP policy document in 
the last federal election, An Agenda For The Knowledge Nation, also rightly highlighted 
the success of Finland’s Nokia, along with famous Swedish brands such as Volvo 
and Saab.34  However, a difference between Hutton and Australian Labor politicians 
in 2001 is that Hutton openly acknowledges the fact that Nokia actually prospered in 
a high taxing, strongly unionised, comprehensive welfare state.35   
 
In the 1990s, writes Hutton, the comparatively “slow overall growth in European 
employment [occurred] in the backwash of German reunification and European 
preparation for monetary union”.36  European unemployment’s “chief cause lies in 
lack of demand in Europe – demand which remains depressed in part because until 
the single currency is bedded down the EU cannot have the same indifference to the 
consequence of stimulating demand as America, and in part because such 
stimulation has been ruled out by the necessary rigours of forming a single 
currency”, he argues.37  By comparing educational outcomes more broadly than just 
universities Hutton also highlights that “in Germany, for example, 80 per cent of 
school-leavers go on to receive either vocational training or a degree, and all except 1 
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per cent receive formal post-secondary education or training, [whereas] in the US 46 
per cent of school-leavers gain no certificate or degree…and an extraordinary 31 per 
cent receive no formal training or education after school”.38  “German workers have 
high levels of education and training…and the training system is integrated into the 
educational system, so that students move seamlessly from schools into training 
colleges or company based apprenticeship systems.  Sixty per cent of German 
teenagers are engaged in some form of vocational training, which carries little of the 
social stigma it still bears in Britain, where it is seen as a second-class option for those 
unable to pursue formal academic qualifications”.39   
 
Hutton is keen to realise “the real political possibilities of…[the] Europe-wide 
institutions and processes, and the purposes to which they are put”.40  He considers 
that “It is perfectly possible to design a more politically accountable system of 
European governance in the here and now, building on what we have, but respecting 
the principle that as far as possible government authorities should be close to the 
people in the member states”.41  He recognises the patchy history and contested 
versions of the European project but argues that a European approach is now 
essential for social democratic values to succeed.  Until Jacques Delors in the late 
1980s, “the European enterprise was becoming ever more [just] an exercise in 
extending free market principles”.  However with the ‘social charter’ in 1989 and 
following the Maastricht treaty of the early 1990s, “Delors’ achievement, in short, 
was to begin to give a distinctive European face to Europe’s capitalism”.  The 
difficult question now, after Delors, is “how is European capitalism to retain its 
character before the march of the market that the EU itself is [now] dedicated to 
further?”, Hutton asks.42  “European leaders …feel they need Europe to be more like 
America, accepting the tidal wave of propaganda from the US that the European way 
is at heart wrong, and that what Europe must do is be Americanised”.43  At the same 
time there is “a growing distrust of the European project among individual European 
electorates as they see Europe knocking down structures that have served them well 
while offering little or nothing to put in their place”.44  There is also a “growing belief 
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among the peoples of Europe that the EU is increasingly a creation of its political and 
business elites around their own agenda”.45  Hutton is concerned that “the single 
currency and the single market, if they are not organised as an economic and social 
space around European values, uniquely expose European capitalism to its de facto 
Americanisation”.46  “Some of the disaffection among Europe’s electorates is plainly 
rooted in the knowledge that voices within national communities increasingly count 
for less and that there is no vehicle for them to count for more – and so they take 
revenge on what is to hand [including refugees].  Paradoxically, the object of their ire 
is the European Union even though European institutions, correctly conceived, are 
among the remedies”, in his eyes.47 
 
For Europe to succeed, Hutton acknowledges that “the decision-making process 
must become more accountable”.48  Hutton’s proposals include for the EU “to 
establish minimum rates of corporate taxation that prevent companies from playing 
one country off against another…This would underpin the tax and social insurance 
base that supports welfare, education and health expenditure throughout Europe – 
and stop the drift away from taxing capital towards taxing labour…By providing 
them with the wherewithal in underwritten minimum tax rates (there should be no 
constraint on high tax rates) and thus a secured tax base, along with commonly 
agreed outcomes, collective action at the European level can empower member states 
to offer their citizens a better social deal…there is already evidence that 
competitiveness increases with a rising tax burden – up to certain reasonable limits.  
The EU will allow states to exercise this choice, rather than condemning them…to 
join in a race to the bottom”.49 
 
The debut of the "euro" on world currency markets was anticipated as the beginning 
of a renaissance of a more unified Europe as a counterweight to US financial 
domination.  Hutton lends support and credence to this prospect.  “The euro…gives 
Europe a world currency – the only conceivable challenger to the dollar, with all that 
implies, including the option of running its economy on more expansionary lines”50 
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and of reforming financial institutions such as the IMF so that they play a much more 
socially acceptable role in the world.  Since Hutton’s book was written the 
positioning of major European nations against the United States of America over the 
issue of war on Iraq has further highlighted trans-Atlantic differences.  Europe in 
some important ways is emerging as a social democratic alternative to US neo-
liberalism.   
 
How does all this relate to Australia?  Australia of course cannot readily become part 
of a major geographical bloc built on high skills, equitable economic prosperity and 
substantial welfare state provision as Britain might by fully embracing Europe.  The 
best Australia could manage along these lines would probably be an amalgamation 
with New Zealand including a single currency (called the “ANZAC”).  However this 
would not have much effect on the world balance of power.  Nevertheless, the strong 
and convincing contestation of the idea that globalisation has cut off political options 
and made the European welfare state unaffordable51 is very relevant to the opening 
up of Australia’s economic and social policy options now.  The sceptical view of 
“globalisation” and how it impacts and does not impact on the possibilities of social 
democratic parties attaining their policy objectives, if disseminated now, would 
generate a greater sense that there are in fact some substantial policy options 
available to the Australian Labor Party.  The successful experience of some small 
individual nations within Europe, such as Denmark, in successfully adapting their 
advanced economic and social models in the 1990s suggests that it is possible for 
Australia now to go in similar policy directions.  Australia does have some traditions 
of equality and fairness – including, historically expressed in, and partly because of, 
its strong Labor Party - which most voters wish to preserve against further 
Americanisation.   
 
Australia and Britain sit between the US and the nations of northern Europe, though 
closer to the US, on most comparative social measures. The most recent available 
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data on inequality in disposable money income52 within nations, which now covers 
the 1990s, is indicative: 
Inequality in OECD nations in 
the 1990s
Decile Ratio*
*The Decile Ratio is the ratio of the income of the person at the 90th (top) percentile 
to the person at the 10th (bottom) percentile of disposable money income
Sweden
Finland
Norway
Luxembourg
Denmark
Netherlands
Germany
Belgium
France
Switzerland
Austria
Spain
Canada
Australia
United Kingdom
Italy
United States
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
In other words, the typical high income earner in Sweden gets about two and a half 
times what the typical low income earner gets; in Australia, the typical high income 
earner gets a bit under - and in Britain a bit over - four and a half times what the 
typical low income earner gets; while in the United States the typical high income 
earner gets more than five a half times what the typical low income earner gets.  As 
the compiler of this data, from the Luxembourg Income Study, Professor Timothy 
Smeeding writes, what it shows is that:  
 
the range of inequality and of social distance between rich and poor in the rich and 
medium-income nations of the world is rather large in the mid-1990s…[this I think is 
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an understatement given the real differences in the quality of lives for millions of people 
that these figures actually express] 
 
[and therefore that] globalization does not force any single outcome on one country… 
 
[Instead,] labour market institutions, welfare policies, etc. – can act as a powerful 
countervailing force to market driven inequality. Even [in] a globalized world, the 
overall distribution of income in a country remains very much a consequence of the 
domestic political, institutional and economic choices made by those individual 
countries.53 
 
This confirms the picture from the extensive empirical study undertaken by Francis 
Castles in his Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Post-war Transformation54 of just 
how widely, and why, the trajectory of policy transformation has varied from 
country to country including into the 1990s; and how much politics still matters in 
shaping economic and social policy outcomes within nations. 
 
Other social indicators also show significant contrast between the US on the one 
hand, and Australia, Britain and the rest of Europe on the other.  The United States is 
an unusually violent society.  The murder rate in the US is more than triple that of 
Australia and more than triple that of the EU member states average.55  The latest 
United Nations research ranks Norway number 1 and Sweden number 2 in the world 
in human development.56  Australia as a society could realistically aspire to reach 
these levels.  The ALP could formulate policies which might make this achievable 
and such policies are likely to be popular with the Australian people. 
 
Recent policy announcements by the Australian Labor Party to defend the universal 
health program of Medicare first introduced under Whitlam and consolidated under 
Labor Governments in the 1980s have explicitly been expressed as opposition to an 
American-style situation of mass public exposure to a lack of adequate basic health 
care.  Australian Labor under Crean has released new policies on education, and has 
indicated that it is about to release further policies on paid maternity leave, as part of 
a continuing move away from the Beazley era of being a small policy target.  These 
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new policies are more likely to make an impact if they express clear philosophical 
support for the principle of increased public investment in both university education 
and post-school vocational training; and for the principle of a re-regulated labour 
market in order to attain equitable social policy outcomes.  The policies are also 
much more likely to be credible if the ALP overcomes its reluctance to acknowledge 
that substantial innovative taxation, as well as expenditure, changes are now needed 
if Australia is to actually acquire the resources to adequately lift its public investment 
in education, training, job creation and regulation, and progressive social welfare 
initiatives.   
 
There remain obvious obstacles to simply transplanting overseas models or even 
parts of them to Australia, including for instance the fact that the Nordic nations are 
relatively small and monocultural.  As part of any analysis of prospects for policy 
transfer from northern European nations to Australia now there would need to be a 
systematic collation of comparative information on the social characteristics of the 
respective nations, and realistic appraisal of their political contexts including the 
varying configurations represented in their political parties and the political effect of 
differences in electoral systems, such as proportional representation. 
 
The point however is that it is now particularly timely, and it can only be beneficial, 
for the ALP to re-establish a truly international - instead of its recent very limited and 
distorted overseas (i.e. Clinton American and Blair British) - perspective on the 
political and policy options open to it.  Regaining a true international perspective, 
informed by a broad comparative politics, involves recognising what kind of society 
Australia actually is compared with others and what kind of society it might or 
might not (want to) become.  It also involves acknowledging where the ALP actually 
belongs in the world families of political parties.  An opening up of Australian 
Labor’s horizons now to the real possibilities which lie amid the currents of 
contemporary European social democracy is likely to improve the ALP’s prospects 
for credible policy development and political renewal.  
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